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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out 
research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is 
exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a 
broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide the full documentation 
of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to 
analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which 
exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and 
concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government 
agencies. 
 
This mini report on Nigeria is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies can be found 
at www/bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon research studies, reports and 
evaluations commissioned by operational agencies, and survey data where this has been 
available. These sources have been complemented by interviews with government 
officers, aid policymakers and practitioners, and researchers. The analysis and opinions 
expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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Executive summary 
 
Armed violence in many areas of Nigeria has escalated since 1999 and is destabilising 
and impoverishing communities. Vigilante groups have sprung up that both protect and 
extort from local communities. Rival gangs in towns such as Lagos are engaged in armed 
violence against each other and also against state security forces with civilians caught in 
the cross fire. Further, a gun culture has been established and there has been a progressive 
militarization of society. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are freely available and 
both regional and state controls are minimal. The state is doing little to protect civilians 
against armed violence and in fact some state agencies are involved or complicit in 
robbing and persecuting sections of the population. All this has contributed to an insecure 
environment where mass displacements are taking place, communities are targeted on 
ethno-religious lines, where livelihoods are difficult to maintain, and extortion and 
insecurity are leading to a growth in private security. 
 
Key research findings 
 SALW are becoming endemic in Nigeria and the pace of acquisition and the lethality 
of weapons are increasing. 
 There is neither sufficient programming to directly address SALW possession, nor the 
will or capacity within the state security services, to fully deal with this problem.  
 State security services are part of the problem often reacting disproportionately to 
sub-state violence or targeting certain communities for reprisals. 
 SSR has been minimal. Limited measures took place in 1999, for example, when the 
government retired large numbers of senior and middle ranking officers. However, 
there has been little follow-up and measures that address some of the deep-rooted 
problems in the security sector. 
 “Arms racing” patterns have been established in Nigeria, where armed groups and the 
security sector seek to acquire more sophisticated and lethal weapons to counter 
acquisitions by rival groups.  
 SALW display has created a climate of fear and coercion, while at the same time, 
there is fear of hidden weapons and the fact that in many areas anyone can be 
carrying a gun and that violence might suddenly erupt.  
 A gun culture and impunity has increasingly been established in Nigeria since 1999, 
particularly among the young.  
 Much of civil society living in certain conflict zones exists in a state of fear 
particularly given the possession of SALW by virtually all sectors of society 
including the young, students, vigilantes, militias, armed groups, politicians, and 
religious movements. 
 Severe poverty impacts have followed SALW possession and usage:  
• Massive displacement has taken place in many conflict arenas and after months 
or even years many civilians have not regarded it as safe to return. As a 
consequence, many markets are no longer operating and fleeing civilians have 
been reliant on subsistence living.  
• Towns, particularly in the Delta region, are open to frequent attacks by armed 
gangs or the security services. This has led to severe interruptions to economic 
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activities and the fear of imminent future attacks has disrupted normal trade 
including fishing.  
• Large areas of farmland in places such as Benue, which has been considered the 
food basket of Nigeria, have been abandoned with consequences, not just for 
that area, but for the rest of Nigeria.  
• The practice of extorting ‘taxes’ on highways coming in and out of places such 
as Lagos has led to traders raising their prices for key goods such as food 
produce and consequently contributing to the further impoverishment of the 
poor.  
• The threat and actual use of armed violence by armed groups, vigilantes, and 
robbers, has led to communities retreating into themselves and often has 
stimulated the growth of private security services (for those who can afford 
them) and vigilante ‘protection’ for the poor.  
• Social capital has been severely eroded by SALW possession and usage. 
Communities have split along ethnic and religious divisions in the face of 
increasing insecurity and attacks by armed groups and security forces.  
 
Programming and related findings 
 State and regional control of flows of SALW, both internally and externally, need to 
be significantly improved if any brake on rampant armed violence in Nigeria is to be 
exerted.  
 Measures need to be taken to address security sector dissemination of weaponry to 
armed gangs and other actors. This should include prosecution of individuals 
involved. However, action in this area will be difficult given current networks of 
corruption within the system. It is also believed that ex-security sector personnel have 
diffused knowledge/expertise of how to use and maintain SALW. Measures to 
address this are required. 
 The security sector needs to respond in a more proportionate way to challenges to 
state authority and outbreaks of armed violence. 
 Programming which addresses SALW possession needs to be urgently set in motion. 
Existing programming does not, in the main, seem to be directly addressing this issue. 
This programming might include Arms for Development (AfD) type programming 
that actually offers incentives for communities to hand in arms, as well as 
programming that addresses the fractures between communities. Extensive 
confidence-building measures will also be required, quite possibly involving regional 
and international connections, in cooperation with the Nigerian government, as well 
as civil society. 
 Reversing the gun culture and militarization of society is an urgent, albeit extremely 
problematic, priority in Nigeria. The rapid pace of the militarization of society since 
1999 is startling and shows signs of deepening. Sensitisation measures would be a 
good starting point, but gun culture seems so entrenched that this will be difficult to 
reverse. Unless the state security forces are able to extend security to its citizens 
SALW will continue to have utility. 
 Security sector reform is urgently required to construct faith in military forces and in 
the police. 
 
 3
Armed violence and poverty in Nigeria, Ginifer, March 2005 
1. Introduction  
 
This case study analyses how, and through which processes, small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) and armed violence1 impact upon community security in urban and 
rural contexts in Nigeria and the type of knock-on impacts this has on poverty. It 
particularly focuses on the availability, proliferation, and use of SALW at the level of 
non-state armed groups. However, it also examines the highly significant role of the state 
security sector in armed violence in Nigeria.  
 
The province of Lagos is a principal focus of the study. Lagos is a ‘mega-city’, with a 
population over 12 million people and extensive SALW possession. It is also the 
economic hub of the country, and embodies the complexities of the wider Nigerian State 
in terms of its multi-ethnic divisions. However, a variety of other contexts – some rural 
and some urban – are also analysed. 
 
The so-called “new wars” and emergence of other contexts of armed violence in Africa 
and other developing regions since 1990 have involved the overwhelming use of SALW 
as the exclusive weapons in 90% of the 49 conflicts during this period, contributing to 
over 6m deaths, of which civilians comprised between 30% and 90%.2 The presence of 
SALW, it has been suggested, has the capacity to transform existing social, cultural, 
ethnic, political and environmental cleavages into violent confrontations. In the case of 
Nigeria, this has been borne out, with the widespread availability and misuse of SALW 
acting as a significant impediment to the peaceful resolution of the underlining socio-
economic and political issues increasingly difficult.3 Further, SALW use in Nigeria has 
increased the scale of lethality, the degree of intensity, casualties, and the extent of 
livelihood destruction and wider developmental impacts. Small arms from local and 
imported sources have been freely used in the more than 50 identifiable outbreaks of 
ethno-religious violence that have broken out since 1999, in which more than 100,000 
people are thought to have died.4  
 
Armed violence has been exacerbated by the fact that older variants of locally-produced 
guns have in the past few years been replaced by more modern weaponry, including 
semi-automatic guns. Many of these are licitly and illicitly imported and these weapons 
are usually second-hand rather than new. Among the weapons now in use in Nigeria are: 
AK47 assault rifles, automatic pump actions shotguns, bazookas, Beretta pistols, 
Browning pistols, carbine rifles, double-barrelled shotguns, G3 rifles, general purpose 
machine guns, and sub-machine guns.  At the same time, traditional weapons such as 
machetes, spears, cutlasses and knives are also in use.  
 
                                                 
1 In the context of this study ‘light weapons’ are defined in terms of heavy machine guns and mortars of up to 100mm, 
and portable anti-tank or aircraft systems. Small arms can be said to comprise automatic or semi-automatic weapons 
including self-loading pistols, revolvers, carbines, rifles, machine-guns, ammunitions, and explosives. 
2 Small Arms Survey (2001), p. 210. 
3 Human Rights Watch (November 2003), p. 1. 
4 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 7. 
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One estimate is that Nigeria accounts for one million of the seven million SALW 
estimated to be in circulation in the West African sub region.5 Another estimate suggests 
that over three million illegal SALW were possessed by Nigerians in 2002.6  
 
1.1 Why Nigeria? 
 
Nigeria was selected as a case study for the following reasons.  
 
First, it presented an opportunity to examine urban contexts of SALW possession and 
usage, as well as some rural contexts. 
 
Second, it enabled the study to investigate how the myriad of non-state armed groups7 
that have sprung up in Nigeria have used SALW to, in effect, militarise society with the 
subsequent impact on poverty and development. This despite the fact that Nigeria is not 
engaged in an internal conflict. Nigeria serves, in part, to demonstrate what happens 
when the state is unable or unwilling to control SALW possession and provide security to 
large sections of the population.  
 
Third, it provides a case study for examining the role of the state security sector itself in 
armed violence. Democratisation – the 1999 transition from a military dictatorship to 
democratic governance – has coincided with an increase in SALW usage and armed 
violence. A recent assessment puts the number of armed violence outbreaks recorded 
between 1999 and 2003 at over 50, with Lagos accounting for at least 15 cases of armed 
violence.8 The state security sector has been heavily implicated in armed violence in 
Lagos and elsewhere. 
 
Fourth, Nigeria presents evidence of the impact of cross-border SALW flows. Nigeria has 
a 1,500 km land border with the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North; a 1,000 km 
land border with Benin in the West; a 1,700 km border with Cameroon in the East; and a 
700 km coastline off the Atlantic Ocean.9 This presents serious problems with regard to 
border policing, exposing the country to cross-border smuggling and trafficking in 
SALW, especially when seen in the regional context of civil wars in other West African 
States such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
Last, Nigeria is a poor country that mirrors many of the problems of countless other 
African states in terms of its destabilization by armed violence and SALW usage, and its 
increasing impoverishment, making this case study useful for drawing some potentially 
important lessons for other African states. Nigeria has Africa’s largest population with a 
World Bank estimate putting the number at 135.7 million, with an annual growth rate of 
2.4%.10 The country mirrors the complexities of many African countries with over 70% 
                                                 
5 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 2. 
6 Obasi (2002), p. 9. 
7 Armed groups in this study are taken to encompass non-state actors such as vigilantes, militias, and student groups. 
For a definition of what constitutes an armed group see: Pablo Policzer (2004), pp. 9-10. 
8 See Adebanwi (October 2003), p. 22. 
9 Agboton-Johnson, Ebo and Mazal (March 2004), p. 21. 
10 See World Bank, “Nigeria at a Glance”, www.worldbank.org. 
 5
Armed violence and poverty in Nigeria, Ginifer, March 2005 
of the population living below the $1 per day threshold, despite huge revenues from oil 
and gas exploration.11 It has an average gross domestic per capita of US $896, and a life 
expectancy rate of 44 years.12  
 
2. Sources of SALW 
 
There are multiple sources of illicit SALW in Nigeria including:  
 
Arms collection shortfalls An example is the failure of the Nigerian government to 
implement an arms collection programme after the country’s civil war (1967-1970). It 
appears that despite rising armed violence including ethno-religious clashes and armed 
criminality since 1999, there is limited information available on how weapons are 
acquired, and limited Nigerian government activity aimed at checking their spread. 
Further, external programming to address SALW is limited and tends to focus on 
reconciliation and conflict prevention rather than on SALW specifically. 
  
Cross-border smuggling. Civil wars in the West-African sub-region since 1990 and the 
deployment of Nigerian military forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone have led to the 
proliferation of SALW into Nigeria. This is facilitated by huge cross-border smuggling 
and mercenary activities (from Chad and Niger for example)13 and the country’s long, 
porous borders that are poorly policed due to inadequate resources and the lack of 
capacity of the security agencies. The three most notorious border posts for illicit 
smuggling of SALW are the Idi-Iroko and Seme (in the south-western States of Lagos 
and Ogun); Warri (in Delta State); and border posts in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states 
in the north-eastern area. Border guards, in a rare successful operation in August 2002, 
announced the seizure of SALW including 510 shotguns rounds along the Lagos-Benin 
border, as part of a total haul of SALW worth US$30m seized in the first six months of 
200214. This development prompted the country’s Justice Minister to declare that: 
 
the smuggling into the country of light weapons and small arms [had] reached an 
alarming situation.15  
 
Arms supplies from the Niger Delta region. The increasing sophistication of organized 
piracy, oil-bunkering16 and hostage-taking in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, 
coupled with the region’s peculiar swampy geography and extensive access to 
international waterways, combine to make the region an important conduit for SALW 
availability and proliferation in Nigeria. 
 
Security Sector black marketeering. The extensive black marketeering of the country’s 
arsenal of SALW by serving and retired security personnel is a major problem. The 
Nigerian President publicly acknowledged this in December 2002, stating that the 
                                                 
11 Christian Aid (October 2004), p. 1. 
12 See UNDP (2002), pp. 151-160. 
13 Federal Government of Nigeria (2003), p.  21. 
14 Human Rights Watch (November 2003), p. 1. 
15 AFP (7 August 2002).  
16 ‘Bunkering’ can be understood as the unauthorised or illegal diversion or stealing of oil or other economic resources. 
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majority of SALW circulating in Nigeria were either sold or rented out by, or stolen 
from, the country’s security agencies.17 It is also believed that ex-security sector 
personnel have diffused knowledge/expertise of how to use and maintain SALW. 
 
Local production. SALW availability is aided by local production by blacksmiths, 
especially in the industrial cities of Aba and Akwa in the south-eastern region.18 
Although the state-owned Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) produces 
SALW, especially rifles, they are mostly used by the police service rather than for 
domestic supply to the civilian population.  
 
3. Motivations for SALW possession 
 
Complex socio-economic factors have fuelled the demand and supply for SALW in 
Nigeria. These include: 
  
 inter-ethnic rivalries;  
 political competition, especially electoral violence;  
 domestic agitation for resource control;  
 militant agitation against environmental degradation resulting from oil and gas 
exploration;  
 the politicization of ethno-religious differences;  
 the large mass of unemployed youths;  
 the increasing profitability, and socio-economic utility of SALW, especially with 
the increase in kidnapping, hostage and ransom-taking.  
 
4. Typologies of armed violence 
 
Across Nigeria, SALW are used in the following activities: 
 
4.1. Inter and intra-communal violence 
 
These forms of armed violence involve social or often ethnic movements, purporting to 
represent particular communities and seeking to protect the covert and overt interest of 
such communities, often through SALW usage. These communities are often built around 
the ancestral origin of a person, rather than where he/she is born. In the Lagos area, the 
Yorubas, for example, consider themselves as the host community (indigenes), with other 
ethnic-based communities considered as settlers and potentially hostile.  
 
Examples of inter-communal violence in Lagos include the Yoruba versus non-Yoruba 
dock workers clashes in Apapa and Tin Island (September 1999); Yoruba versus Hausa 
(Shukura) and Yam sellers (November 1999); Yoruba-Hausa clashes in Bariga (January 
2000); and armed violence between Yorubas and Hausas in Idi-Araba in 2002. There are 
also cases of armed violence resulting from intra-group power struggles, especially 
                                                 
17 The President stated this in his Presidential monthly chat with the media in December 2001, cited in Agboton-
Johnson, A., Ebo, A., and Mazal, L. (March 2004), p. 23. 
18 Human Rights Watch (November 2003), p. 1.  
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within the Yoruba group whose representative social movement (Odua’h People’s 
Congress: OPC) is factionalized.  
 
Elsewhere in Nigeria there were Tiv versus Jukun clashes in Benue and Taraba States 
(October 2001); Inyimagu versus Agbaja clashes in Ebonyi State (May 2003); and the 
protracted clashes between Ijaws and Itshekiris in Warri – to mention but a few.  
 
Much of this inter-communal violence is underpinned by claims and counter-claims of 
socio-economic deprivations and political marginalization, and attempts to assert control 
by a particular community, including rights over land ownership.   
 
4.2 Ethnic militia and vigilante violence 
 
The rise in ethnic nationalism and ethnic movements, coupled with the lack of state 
capacity to discharge its security functions, especially policing, has often devolved the 
function of local policing and security to self-styled vigilante groups. Ethnic movements 
are “double-hatted” as vigilante groups, and often enjoy the tacit support of locals, 
because of the security function they perform. In Lagos, the OPC is the main vigilante 
group. However, in the discharge of vigilante functions, there is a huge degree of 
unregulated, extra-judicial use of SALW and violence on both defenceless civilians and 
targeted individuals and groups. The January 2000, extra-legal killings by the OPC 
against alleged armed robbers and touts in the Akala area of Lagos and several other 
unreported cases in other parts of Lagos are significant examples.  
 
This trend is reproduced across Nigeria where even political establishments and elected 
public officers give ‘legitimacy’ to the activities of vigilante groups, deflecting from the 
need to address the logistical and operational inadequacies of the police service. A clear 
example of this was the 2000 formal adoption of the Bakassi Boys as the state vigilante 
service in Imo, Abia and Anambra States in the south-east region. 
 
4.3 Political and electoral violence 
 
The transition from military dictatorship to democratic governance has occurred in 
parallel with the upsurge in armed violence in Nigeria. This illustrates the close 
connection between political competition, especially elections, and SALW and armed 
violence. The political process has heightened the potential for violence at every level of 
government.19 This trend percolates the entire Nigerian State where political elites 
mobilize the pool of unemployed youths, often along ethnic, religious and party 
affiliations, as a vital political resource. This underscores the great value attached to the 
utility of violence in politics, with political and electoral success often indexed to the 
capacity to threaten or unleash violence. It is alleged that incumbents of power, in the 
run-up to the 2003 elections, aided the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria by arming 
youths and political thugs to manipulate electoral outcomes by kidnapping or killing 
political opponents, threatening and intimidating electorates, destroying lives and 
properties, and disrupting election campaigns. 
                                                 
19 Human Rights Watch (2003), p. 4.   
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4.4. Armed criminality and 'gangsterism' 
 
Another consequence of the increase in SALW in Lagos and Nigeria at large is the rise in 
all forms of criminality, especially armed robberies in residential neighbourhoods and 
along motorways both during the day and night. The failure of the police service, in spite 
of a series of highly publicized police actions (‘Operation-Fire-For Fire’, for instance) 
and force expansion, and the subsequent rise in self-help security measures by the 
citizenry through vigilante groups, is an acknowledgement of the escalating rise in armed 
criminality. Over the past five years, armed criminality has been transformed into 
organized banditry, piracy, bunkering and hostage-taking in the oil rich Niger-Delta 
region. Further, there has been a rise in gangster violence evidenced by the proliferation 
of ‘secret cults’ in institutions of higher learning in Nigeria. Armed criminals and secret 
cultists are known to possess and use sophisticated SALW, especially pistols, assault 
rifles (commonly AK-47), and sub-machine guns. 
 
Lagos has borne the brunt of armed criminality. In 2001, for example, there were 186 
reported armed robberies in the city, and 486 robbers were killed and 845 were arrested. 
At the same time, 16 police and 70 civilians were killed.20  
 
4.5 State armed violence 
 
The state has been ineffective in reining in SALW possession and usage. Elements of the 
security sector, in fact, have aided SALW-violence. The State and its security agents are 
seen as partial, supporting rival groups or factions that are best connected to the seat of 
political power.21  
 
The state, in fact, is involved in armed violence at two levels: first, in its often violent 
attempts to restore law and order; and second, in this perception (sometimes mistaken) 
that it is intervening on one side. In the southern region (including Lagos) for example, 
the state is often perceived as supporting northern (Hausa) interests, a fact that regularly 
invites armed confrontation between the security services and ethnic movements, 
especially the OPC.  
 
Across Nigeria, state forces have also been embroiled in armed violence with sub-state 
groups in Warri, Rivers (Buguma and Ogoni) and Bayelsa (Odi) with groups such as the 
Ijaws, Itshekiris, and others. Also, it has been involved in Benue, Taraba and Plateau 
States with Tivs, Jukuns, and Taroks,  and in Kano, Kaduna, Yobe, Kebbi and Maiduguri 
Borno States, with ethno-religious groups, including the ‘Nigerian Taliban’. 
 
4.6 State-sponsored violence 
 
Security forces have exercised violence against groups and citizens considered to be 
challenging their monopoly of violence. The harassment, arbitrary arrests, and physical 
abuse of suspected and actual OPC members in Lagos and across the south-west region 
                                                 
20 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 9. 
21 See Ibeanu (1999), pp. 161-179. 
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exemplify this. This trend is even more visible in other parts of Nigeria, such as in the 
November 1999 military invasion and destruction of the Odi community in Bayelsa, and 
the October 2001 punitive military attacks against the Tivs of Zaki Diem in Benue.  
 
The use of SALW by elements in the security services to take over and maintain power 
has led to a ‘militarised national psyche and culture of violence’.22 The impression has 
been created that power flows from the barrel of a gun, and the military has lost its 
monopoly on the use of armed force with elements in society and various groups seeing 
armed violence as a legitimate way of settling disputes or maintaining security.23  
 
4.7 Ethno-religious violence 
 
Ethno-religious violence appears to be the most common form of armed violence in post-
military Nigeria, although less so in Lagos. The reoccurrence of ethno-religious armed 
violence in the northern region has led to extensive killings and material destruction. The 
outbreak of violence is strongly linked to the growth of the Sharia criminal 
code/movement, which swept through the northern region immediately after the return to 
democratic governance in 1999 and which has led to clashes in Jos between the native 
Christian Boroms/Anaguta/Izere and the Muslim Hausa/Fulani in September 2001; 
clashes in Kano over the American war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
(October 2001); and the clashes over the aborted Miss World Beauty contest (November 
2002). There has also been the emergence of a Nigerian Taliban movement that has 
engaged in violent activities in Yobe and Borno states. 
 
4.8 Arms racing 
 
The ready availability of arms and their use has generated cycles of violence where both 
civilians need to defend themselves and where various armed groups see the necessity of 
acquiring more and more arms to protect themselves or to launch attacks. This is leading 
to the militarization of security and also a demand for more and more powerful and 
sophisticated weapons in order to keep up or maintain some form of parity.  
 
5. Armed violent actors 
 
The main actors involved in armed violence and possessing and using SALW are: 
 
5.1 Ethnic militias 
 
In Lagos and across the south-west region, the dominant ethnic militia-cum-vigilante 
group is the OPC. In the south-east region, it is predominantly the Bakassi Boys, but 
other micro level militia groups have been formed in response to inter-communal 
violence in Umuleri, Aguleri, Inyimagu, Agbaja, Mbiakong and Ifiayong among others. 
In the south-south region, the major militia groups include the Ijaw Youth Congress and 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), 
                                                 
22  Ebo, A., (2003), p. 3. 
23 Small Arms Survey (2003), p. 3. 
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and militias from the Urhobos and Itshekiris. In the northern region, there are the Arewa 
People’s Congress, the Al-Sunnah Wal Jamma (Nigerian Taliban), and militia groups 
from the Taroks, Tivs, Igede and Jukuns. These militia groups often double as ethno-
religious groups involved in armed violence. 
 
5.2 ‘Area Boys’ 
 
This description embraces often unemployed opportunistic young persons, mostly males, 
many of whom are taking drugs, that abound in Lagos. They are easily mobilized for 
armed violence, and are known to be efficient in unleashing violence with SALW and 
traditional weapons. There is no data on their number, but there are probably several 
thousand of them scattered across Lagos. Area Boys have traditionally had some positive 
connotations and have been seen by some communities as providing services to the 
community. But they started to turn into a negative phenomenon in the late 1980s as a 
result, in part, of government economic adjustment programmes that exacerbated 
unemployment and resulted in cut-backs on social service provision, and of the increase 
in narcotic trading and consumption in Lagos. Area Boys can be found in other parts of 
Nigeria, especially in the northern region where the activities of the Al-Majiris parallel 
area boys in Lagos.  
 
5.3 Youths and students 
 
Youths and students are the main perpetrators of armed criminality and gangsterism. In 
fact, the huge youth population in Nigeria, estimated by the UN to be 25 million24, that is 
economically, socially and politically deprived, have taken up and invested in armed 
violence -related skills. The youth crisis is strongly linked to armed violence in Nigeria.  
 
5.4 Criminal gangs 
 
Criminal gangs are involved, among other things, in armed robberies, piracy, oil- 
bunkering, hostage-taking, and gangster violence. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF), for example, has been involved in oil-bunkering activities.25  
 
5.5 State security agencies 
 
This includes the police, paramilitaries, special security elements, and the armed forces 
involved in internal security operations. Many of these are involved in illicit activities 
backed up by the threat of, or actual use, of armed violence.  
 
                                                 
24 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2003), p.  93. 
25 See ‘Nigeria’ (20 July 2004). 
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6. The tactics and strategies of SALW-armed violence 
 
SALW are used in Nigeria for, among other things: 
 
6.1 Threats and intimidation 
  
The public display of SALW by armed groups and the security services is used to deter 
and to secure compliance: for example, to rob civilians of their possessions. The OPC 
undertakes patrols and marches brandishing traditional weapons and charms, and SALW. 
These ‘confidence-patrols’ serve to perpetuate a psychology of fear and instil a culture of 
impunity. The threat and intimidation from SALW possession is also linked to past acts 
of SALW related armed violence undertaken with impunity. The state security service 
use their legal possession of SALW to instil fear and secure compliance with extra-legal 
demands, not least the collection of illegal taxes (kola) at check-points and for extra-
judicial arrests. Those on low incomes are among the most vulnerable to illegal taxation 
and rising prices of key items such as food. 
 
6.2. Active use of SALW 
 
The extensive destruction of lives, properties and displacement of civilians through 
threats (for example, enforced departures from communities) and the actual use of SALW 
to kill and injure is quite common across SALW-armed elements in Nigeria. 
 
6.3 Disproportionate force 
 
In Lagos there are regular occurrences of killings, arrests, and detention, and injuries to 
defenceless civilians in operations conducted by state security organisations that are 
supposed to be restoring law and order. This trend is reproduced across Nigeria as with, 
for example, the attacks on the Odi Community and the military invasion of Wase. 
Underpinning the massive punitive actions by security agencies are their attempts to 
‘teach trouble makers a lesson’ and to demonstrate the power of the state. However, this 
often seems to undermine rather than buttress law and order. 
 
6.4 Illegal detention and hostage-taking 
 
The OPC, for example, has often detained individuals and executed suspected criminals 
with impunity. This activity occurs in other regions of Nigeria, especially in the south-
south, where hostage-taking with a view to extracting ransom, mostly from multi-national 
oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region, has been occurring. Even the state 
security services are engaged in this, with a spate of extra-judicial arrests and executions 
of both suspected criminals and defenceless civilians. Most residents of Lagos complain 
that ordinary civilians are arrested in numerous illegal raids by the police. The raids are 
perceived as ‘fundraising’ endeavours by the local population. In most cases, detainees  
released are neither charged, nor on formal bail, but are allowed to leave detention when 
their families pay a ransom. 
 
 12
Armed violence and poverty in Nigeria, Ginifer, March 2005 
7. Variations in armed violence and SALW possession/usage 
 
7.1. Urban-rural divide 
 
SALW usage is widespread and developed in both urban and rural areas. Lagos is an 
urban centre, with hardly any rural areas, but even the outskirt settlements in Oko-Baba, 
Epe, Ipaja, and Agege among others that could be considered relatively rural, hardly 
differ from the more urban centre in terms of the patterns of armed violence.  
 
The OPC, for example, is stronger and more popular in ‘less-urban’ areas because of their 
neighbourhood security functions, and because of a reduced government presence. Even 
when armed violence takes place in rural provinces, it is as well-planned and lethal as in 
urban centres. The use of sophisticated SALW in inter-communal clashes, such as the 
Ife-Modakeke crises; the Tiv-Jukun clashes; the Umuleri-Aguleri clashes; and the violent 
activities of the Nigerian Taliban in rural communities in the northern region; and the 
extensive SALW-armed violence in the riverine areas of the Niger-Delta region, confirms 
this. The only real difference in terms of urban and rural contexts might be in the speed of 
government intervention, with armed violence in urban centres tending to attract faster 
media coverage and government responses. 
 
7.2. Gender 
 
Armed violence and SALW possession and impacts seem to embrace both male and 
females. In Lagos, membership of the OPC involves men and women, with women 
actively involved in the frontline combat activities of the group. Casualties from armed 
violence in Lagos are both male and female. These developments seem to a lesser extent 
to be mirrored in other theatres of armed violence in Nigeria, especially in the Delta 
region where women groups, albeit without SALW, have organized protests and 
disrupted oil exploration operations.  
 
7.3. The youth issue 
 
Armed violence and SALW use across Nigeria is underpinned by the youth issue. Many 
of the young are reacting to their deprivation by attacking the existing status quo and 
turning to violence. The leadership and membership of the OPC and other groups is 
overwhelmingly youthful. The problems of ethnicity, politics, and religion to an extent 
obscure the fact that much armed violence is by the young and represents an increasing 
‘self-help’ attitude and ‘normalisation’ of a gun culture among youths. 
  
7.4. Democratisation and armed violence 
 
The transition in 1999 from military dictatorship to democratic rule has seen a dramatic 
increase in SALW use and casualties in Lagos and across Nigeria rather than a ‘peace’ 
dividend. Although SALW and armed violence predate 1999 there has been increases in 
the number, diffusion, and sophistication of SALW and an increase in their use compared 
to traditional weapons. Paradoxically, the transition to democratic rule seems to have 
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militarized society. At the same time, disillusionment that the possibilities of democratic 
rule have not been realised has created despair and increased militancy. 
 
8.  SALW usage and impacts  
 
This section reviews some of the key contexts in Nigeria where SALW have been used – 
some rural and some urban – and their security and other impacts. It is clear that a major 
contributor to armed violence has not just been non-state armed groups, but also state 
security forces that have responded to armed violence and sometimes engaged in what 
civil society has regarded as reprisals.26
 
8.1. Niger Delta  
 
Odi is a town in Nigeria’s troubled Niger Delta region. After a number of incidents and 
the killing of policemen, elements of the Nigerian Army moved in on 20 November 1999. 
It was alleged that: 
 
…although there was no resistance, the government kept shooting for 14 days and 
burning the houses of the people, while people were dying and hungering (sic) in 
the bush.27  
 
It was noted by a civil liberties organization that by 14 December 1999 no livestock 
remained, that the 60,000 inhabitants had either been killed, arrested, or fled into the 
forest.28  The death toll of the army’s 14-day stay was said to be over 1,000. Further, 
many who fled to avoid the shootings died due to the adverse conditions in the bush. 
Those who survived and returned found that their sources of livelihood had been 
destroyed. It was found that over 95% of the Odi population were displaced by the 
invasion and in 2002 at least 90% of the population were still living in temporary 
structures.29  
 
Armed violence continued with an ‘unprecedented upsurge’ in violent clashes and attacks 
across the waterfronts surrounding the state capital and which has even spread into the 
streets of Port Harcourt and beyond.30 The measure of the intensity of armed violence in 
Rivers State can be gauged by events in Ataba (a riverine community in the Andoni 
Local Government Area) on 15 August 2004 when the community came under heavy 
gunfire and shelling. The previously peaceful community was turned into a battle ground 
when rival forces known as ‘Nigeria’ and ‘Biafra’ clashed: 
 
AK-47 (sic), dynamites (sic) and grenades were freely used by the forces…Over 
60 villagers were killed, houses and properties destroyed, while the town was 
turned into a ghost town.31  
                                                 
26 The majority of the data and analysis presented in this section draws upon OMCT and CLEEN (2002). 
27 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 77. 
28 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 78. 
29 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 80. 
30 SAP (October 2004), p. 3. 
31 SAP (October 2004), p. 3. 
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Armed clashes in many of the oil-rich cities in Rivers State have left tens of thousands of 
people internally-displaced. Further, communities, particularly in water-front areas, have 
been emptied because of fears of imminent attacks and warnings from warlords 
promising to ‘visit’ them.32  
 
At least 1,000 sophisticated arms were collected under The Rivers State Arms-for-Cash 
Programme in the Niger Delta region. The surrendering of nearly 200 weapons by the 
NDPVF in October 2004 for cash, for example, was a positive development. However, 
the militia was said to have over 3,000 guns in its arsenal.33
 
8.2. Ife-Modakeke  
 
The Ille-Ife and Modakeke are two neighbouring communities in Osun State in south-
west Nigeria. Both communities are so intertwined that it is difficult to delineate a clear-
cut boundary between them. Further, the two communities belong to the Yoruba nation. 
However, both communities have a long history of mutual antipathy that has frequently 
spilled over into violence.  
 
Some of the most recent clashes occurred between the communities in February 2000. 
These were over citizenship rights and land-ownership that spilled over into armed 
violence including the use of differing calibres of guns, machetes, knives, broken bottles 
and stones.34 In 2002, two years after the conflict, it was found that thousands of people 
had been internally displaced and 53 houses were counted that had been totally destroyed 
and remained to be re-built or rehabilitated.35 The Modakeke market only recorded scanty 
trading on market days, many shops closed early, there was no nightlife, and many 
businesses had been ruined, looted or destroyed.  
 
8.3. Aguleri-Umuleri  
 
A major feature of the Aguleri/Umuleri/Umuoba-Anam crisis, which has included armed 
violence, has been increases in poverty levels. In Umuleri, for example, it was reported 
that in the aftermath of the 1999 violence, there were many people, in a survey 
undertaken, who could no longer afford food. Economic activities had dramatically 
slowed down as individuals who had investments had taken them out of the town and 
security measures taken in the town had further restricted economic activities. Banks had 
closed down and young people had left the area leaving behind mainly the old and frail. 
The armed violence also affected the health of those remaining as existing health 
facilities were destroyed during the crisis and residents had no access to hospitals.36  
 
                                                 
32 SAP (October 2004), p. 6. 
33 IRIN (2 November 2004), p. 1. 
34 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 43. 
35 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 45. 
36 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 61. 
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8.4. Jos  
 
Plateau State was regarded as a centre of tourism and peace until 7 September 2001 when 
armed violence broke out in the state capital, Jos, between indigenes and non-indigenes. 
This included a religious dimension with both churches and mosques being burnt down. 
‘Sophisticated’ military weapons were used in the killings that were perpetuated by 
‘Christian and Muslim youths (taking) up arms against each other’.37 More than a 
thousand people may have been killed before some order was restored by the intervention 
of soldiers. However, it was reported that: 
 
The crisis…left in its wake mental trauma and a permanent suspicion among the 
city’s dwellers. Three months after the crisis, people were still reluctant to go 
back to their homes for fear of being attacked.38  
 
Further, many people sought safety by retreating into areas divided along ethnic or 
religious lines where they thought they were most likely to be protected.  
 
As well as armed violence from factions, the police were alleged to be involved in 
indiscriminate shootings, and judicial executions. There were reports of the police 
shooting unarmed civilians not engaged in criminal acts. It was suggested that as many as 
50,000 people were displaced in the Jos crisis. Also, thousands of homes, buildings, and 
other forms of property were destroyed.39 However, the numbers of displaced may be 
considerably higher than 50,000. 
 
The Jos Market lies in ruins and some traders who have not been able to find capital to 
re-start in business are said to have committed suicide. At the time of the attacks business 
at the market was at its peak due to the influx of Igbo traders from the northern cities 
following concerns regarding the implementation of Sharia codes.   
 
8.5. Benue  
 
In the Middle Belt, longstanding inter-ethnic clashes between the Tiv and Jukun, which 
were supposed to be mediated by a military peacekeeping contingent, led to the murder 
of government troops who were, according to some accounts, coming to teach the Tiv a 
lesson. This spilled over into brutal reprisals by the army. According to a police 
spokesperson, the army had been called in because they were unable to cope with: 
 
People…being killed daily by masked youths who set up unaccountable 
roadblocks and are armed with sophisticated weapons.40  
 
At Gbeji village in Ukum Local Government Area, soldiers were said to have opened fire 
on the crowd indiscriminately including shooting women and children fleeing into the 
                                                 
37 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 110. 
38 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), pp. 107-8. 
39 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 118. 
40 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 154. 
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bush. Avenging soldiers were said to have sacked nearly all villages and settlements in 
Ukum, Katsina-Ala and Logo Local Government Areas.  
 
Zaki Biam lay in ruins after the invasion and Nigeria’s largest yam market – Dan 
Anyacha – was destroyed and the stalls remained closed to business six months later.41 
Displaced persons fleeing conflict in the Middle Belt and seeking to find camps 
established by the Benue state government and charitable organizations found themselves 
having to pass through checkpoints manned by the army and police who systemically 
extorted money from them. Confidence in the army as guarantors of their security was 
said to be virtually non-existent among displaced persons.42  
 
9. Findings on impacts of armed violence on poverty 
 
9.1. Erosion or reinforcing of social capital 
 
The extensive possession and use of SALW and the attendant explosion in armed 
violence has eroded positive social capital in Lagos and across some areas of Nigeria. 
Long years of peaceful co-existence and flourishing socio-economic ties between 
different ethnic, religious and communal groups has given way to bitter armed 
confrontation between communities, religions and ethnic groups. In Lagos, for example, 
the indigenous Yoruba community has clashed frequently with the settler Hausa, Ijaw, 
and Igbo communities. Positive social capital (marked by inter-group networks, co-
operation and trust) has been replaced by negative social capital signposted by bitter 
mistrust, suspicion and confrontation. Although the strengthening of group solidarity 
(bonding social capital) has occurred in certain communities – in resisting other group’s 
attacks, for example – this is likely to be a negative development in the long run. Within 
groups, fractures are also developing such as the widening gap between rebellious youths 
and adults, which threatens the stability of some groups and society at large. This can be 
seen in the factionalisation of the OPC and also the emergence of youths as community 
leaders and spokespersons in the Niger Delta region. Ebbing social capital has in some 
areas reduced inter-group economic and commercial transactions. Massive internal 
displacement has also had knock-on impacts upon social capital and economic 
transactions.  
 
More generally, the widespread possession of guns – in Aba, for example, in south-east 
Nigeria, one in 10 residents is said to own a gun – has led to a state of fear and mistrust in 
society. According to a Nigerian newspaper: 
 
…the man or women you sat next to in a bus minutes ago may have a gun 
concealed somewhere in his or her body. Whether they are displayed or 
concealed, guns are almost as common as sachets of ‘pure water’ in our different 
environments today, and the result is pervasive anxiety, fear, oppression and 
violence that seem to have become part of our daily lives.43
                                                 
41 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 154. 
42 OMCT and CLEEN (2002), p. 161. 
43 Punch Newspaper (2004), p. 15. 
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9.2. Disruption of socio-economic activities 
 
There is massive disruption of socio-economic activities across parts of Nigeria. First, 
internal displacement was estimated by Nigeria’s Vice-President in 2002 to be 750,00044, 
and currently is put at over 800,00045. Most displaced people lose their businesses to 
looting and their homes are often destroyed. They become dependent on assistance and 
many sink into poverty.   
 
Second, the recurring spate of SALW-armed violence that is now a feature of life in areas 
of Nigeria engenders an atmosphere of insecurity that discourages formal and informal 
economic activities. This insecurity derives both from the threat and actual unleashing of 
violence. In Lagos, the 25 November 1999 and the 15 October 2000 clashes recorded 170 
and 100 casualties within 24 hours respectively.46 Across Nigeria, an estimated 53,000 
people were killed from SALW-armed violence between 2001 and 2004. Insecurity is 
central to the abandonment of large farmlands in Benue, a state considered the ‘food 
basket’ of Nigeria. In the Niger Delta region, the incessant armed maritime attacks that 
are taking place contributes to Nigeria being allocated an unenviable third position in 
maritime insecurity,47 but also disrupts local fishing and water-based businesses.  The 
government has estimated that Nigeria has lost US$2 billion to the bunkering activities of 
sea pirates in the Delta region.48  
 
A third factor is the use of SALW to intimidate and unleash violence against civilians in 
Lagos and across Nigeria for the purpose of collecting illegal taxes and looting, and 
which contributes to impoverishment. In Lagos, the OPC and the police exercise indirect 
control over virtually all the motor parks and major markets (Mile 12, Mushin, Ereko, for 
example) by acting as the ‘backbone’ or ‘guarantors’ of the gangs or groups that control 
the parks. This role attracts considerable financial returns, and contributes to increased 
overhead costs of transportation and consequently the price of goods. This trend of illegal 
tax collection is most glaring on the part of the police as evidenced by the many roads-
blocks and checkpoints that abound in Lagos and across Nigeria. Motorists, especially 
commercial transporters and haulage vehicles, are regularly targeted for illegal taxes with 
a minimum of N20 ($0.15) per journey. A cursory look at the Mile 2-Badary motorway, 
for example, which is critical for cross border trade with the Republic of Benin, reveals 
several checkpoints. The kola charges are ultimately borne by the masses.  Even where 
taxes are not directly extorted – long distance buses, for example, are not usually stopped 
at checkpoints because advance payments are made to the authorities to be given a 
‘waiver’ – the cost is still borne by commuters.49 This pattern is repeated across Nigeria 
as the deployment of security forces to restore law and order becomes a window for 
extracting money from already impoverished civilians. The 17.5% annual inflation rate 
for Nigeria over the past four years further exacerbates the poverty of those that fall 
victim to armed violence.  
                                                 
44 See ThisDay (April 4), 2003.   
45 See IRIN, ‘Nigeria: 800,000 internally displaced across country-refugee agency’, (internet). 
46 See Human Rights Watch World Report (2001), (internet). 
47 See IRIN, ‘Nigeria: Piracy report says Nigeria waters the most deadly’, (internet). 
48 Vanguard (9 March 2005), (internet). 
49 Source: Rev. Selbut Longtau, Development Alternatives, Research & Training (DART) in Nigeria.  
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Fourth, violence committed with SALW has led to massive destruction. The 2002 Idi-
Araba clashes, for example, left several thousand vehicles damaged, burnt houses, and 
looted businesses. Similarly, the SALW-armed violence in Benue, Taraba, and Jos-
Plateau led to the destruction of vast farmlands, the killing of several thousand livestock, 
and a near-complete ruin of the agricultural sector in the nation’s most agriculturally 
productive region50. The deployment of armed personnel, ostensibly to restore law and 
order, has often led to even greater destruction, especially of infrastructure, farmlands, 
and livestock.  
 
9.3 Savings, revenue and investments 
 
The disruption of economic activities at the micro level has had negative impacts on 
savings, investments and earnings. This reality may not be reflected in the national 
statistics because the national economy is structured and anchored on big business 
investment in the oil and gas, and telecommunication sectors. Yet, massive displacement, 
and the destruction of lives and properties limit the ability of the masses to save, invest, 
or even earn a living. This has knock-on implications for local government authorities 
responsible for providing local social services from local taxation and other means.  
 
9.4. Social services  
 
A further consequence of SALW-armed violence has been the reduced government 
capacity to deliver social services that were sub-standard prior to the intensification of 
SALW possession and usage in 1999. Government services, including schools, health 
units, and government offices and officials, have been targets of SALW-armed violence. 
Further, government resources have been directed towards security rather than social 
provision as armed violence increases. 
 
9.5. Declining security 
 
The involvement of vigilante groups in neighbourhood ‘policing’ sometimes makes them 
popular locally and can bring short-term benefits in terms of law and order. However, the 
overall impact of SALW-armed violence by vigilante groups appears to be negative. 
Vigilante groups in Nigeria are prone to extra-judicial and politicized killings, and often 
target police stations thereby further incapacitating those police who might provide some 
basis for law and order.51 Further, armed criminals and gangsters are linked to the huge 
increase in armed robberies and the way-laying of travelling vehicles, including those 
carrying traders, produce and goods. Further, there is little faith in the security services 
that are credited with the extra-judicial killing of over 10,000 civilians over the past four 
years.52 Military operations in Odi and Zaki-Biam (Benue), for example, destroyed 
schools, health centres, and houses, and included the use of rocket propelled grenades 
(RPGs) and mortars.   
                                                 
50 See IRIN, ‘Nigeria: Villagers running scared despite state of emergency’, (internet). 
51 The November-December clashes between the OPC and the Police destroyed 12 police stations. 
52 See OMCT and CLEEN (2002) for details on the security services’ involvement in violence.  
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9.6. Rises or reductions in armed criminality, banditry and gangsterism 
 
The ready availability, proliferation, and use of SALW, despite strict firearms laws,53 
have emboldened criminals, bandits and secret cults, to engage in armed criminality, and 
armed confrontations with the police are a regular occurrence. This has resulted in 
considerable deaths and injuries. There have been 273 civilian deaths, and 183 (killed) 
and 133 (injured) policemen from armed banditry in Lagos between August 2000 and 
May 2001.54   
 
Vigilante groups seem to have stemmed the tide of armed robbery in parts of Lagos, but 
other forms of criminality including daylight raiding of markets, banks, and shops, way-
laying of travelling vehicles and hostage taking, seems to have increased considerably 
over the past four years. The increase in the sophistication of SALW used by armed 
criminals and gangsters has overwhelmed the police, prompting the regular use of the 
army in internal security roles.  
 
Corruption within the legal system had led to the failure of criminals to be bought to 
justice leading to a mentality of ‘self-help’ among sections of the population and 
contributing to the acquisition of small arms by civilians who regard the state apparatus 
of law and order with suspicion. In fact, the militarization of society has led to a ‘gun 
culture’ where small arms are regarded as ‘fashionable means of addressing social issues 
and disagreements’. 55  
 
In surveys undertaken in Kaduna State, it was found that there was a higher level of small 
arms possession in urban rather than rural areas, and higher levels of crime in urban 
contexts. Of those robbed, 71% of city respondents had been robbed with a firearm, 
compared to 16% in rural areas.56 Anecdotally, this trend seems to apply across many 
parts of Nigeria. 
 
9.7. Growth of private security 
 
The wealthier in Nigeria have used private security companies for protection and have 
highly fortified their property, but the poor have been unable to do this and have been left 
to fend for themselves and have proved vulnerable to robbery and as a result have 
become more impoverished. Some of the poor have come under the wing of vigilante 
groups but this has left them vulnerable to extortion and abuse. 
 
In Kaduna City, for example, it is said that increased criminality has had significant 
implications for both corporate organizations and individuals. In Kaduna Metropolis the 
numbers of clients seeking the services of private security companies had escalated from 
                                                 
53 The penalty for illegal ownership of a firearm is four years imprisonment, or a N100,00 fine, or both. Ebo, A., 
(2003), p. 5. 
54 BBC (20 February 2003), (internet).  
55 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 6. 
56 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 24. 
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96 in 1997 to 205 in 2001. Further, the numbers of guards employed had risen 
dramatically.57  
 
In terms of vigilante groups, it was estimated in 2001 that 487 vigilante volunteers were 
engaged in Kaduna city per annum, covering 4,386 houses. On the basis of a payment of 
N500 per household, it was estimated that N2,343,000 was spent on the services of 
vigilante groups per month in Kaduna metropolis in 2001. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
10.1. Research findings 
 
 SALW are becoming endemic in Nigeria and the pace of acquisition and the 
lethality of weapons is rapidly increasing. 
 There is neither sufficient programming to directly address SALW possession, 
nor the will or capacity within the state security services, to fully deal with this 
problem.  
 Arms racing patterns have been established in Nigeria where groups and the 
security sector seek to acquire more sophisticated and lethal weapons to counter 
acquisitions by rival groups. The police, in particular, have been unable to keep 
up with the weapons acquired by armed groups. This has frequently led to the 
army being called in. At times, army units have acted in a disproportionate 
manner, further exacerbating armed violence. 
 Ex-security sector personnel are contributing to the diffusion of SALW and, it is 
also thought, to the diffusion of knowledge and expertise on how to use and 
maintain SALW.  
 SALW are not the only weapons of concern in Nigeria. Increasingly, heavier 
weapons are being used in certain conflict zones and ‘traditional’ weapons are 
playing a part. However, it is also clear that SALW display has created a climate 
of fear and coercion, while at the same time, there is fear of hidden weapons and 
the fact that in many areas anyone can be carrying a gun and that violence might 
suddenly erupt. This has eroded or damaged social capital. 
 A gun culture and a culture of impunity have increasingly been established in 
Nigeria since 1999, particularly, but not exclusively, among the young. This has 
grave implications for both civil society and the state.  
 Much of civil society living in certain conflict zones exists in a state of fear, 
particularly given the possession of SALW by virtually all sectors of society 
including the young, students, vigilantes, militias, armed groups, politicians, and 
religious movements. 
 The prospect of escalating armed violence following the next election in Nigeria 
cannot be discounted. 
 The poverty impacts of SALW in Nigeria have not been well delineated in terms 
of hard data as yet. However, this study has established the following findings. 
Massive displacement has taken place in many conflict arenas and after months or 
                                                 
57 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 20. 
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even years many civilians have not regarded it as safe to return. As a 
consequence, many markets are no longer operating and fleeing civilians have 
been reliant on subsistence living. This has impoverished whole communities. 
Towns, as in the Delta region, are open to frequent attacks by armed gangs or the 
security services. This has led to severe interruptions to economic activities and 
the fear of imminent future attacks has disrupted normal trade including fishing. 
Large areas of farmland in places such as Benue, which has been considered the 
food basket of Nigeria, have been abandoned with consequences, not just for that 
area, but also other areas of Nigeria. The practice of extorting ‘taxes’ on highways 
coming in and out of places such as Lagos has led to traders raising their prices 
for key goods such as food produce and consequently contributing to the further 
impoverishment of the poor. The threat and actual use of armed violence by 
armed groups, vigilantes, and robbers, has led to communities retreating into 
themselves and often the growth of private security services (for those who can 
afford them) and vigilante ‘protection’ for the poorer. Both these have involved 
material costs for communities and curtailments in trade and normal economic 
and other forms of cross-community exchanges. The regeneration of communities 
damaged by armed violence will require the massive injection of funds, which are 
unlikely to be available, to bring the majority of the population in places such as 
Mavo and Wase, which have been devastated by ethno-religious crisis, to even a 
‘bearable’ level of poverty. Last, social capital has been severely eroded by 
SALW possession and usage. Communities have split along ethnic and religious 
divisions in the face of increasing insecurity and attacks by armed groups and 
security forces.  
 
10.2. Programming and related findings 
 
 State and regional control of flows of SALW, both internally and externally, 
needs to be significantly improved if any brake on rampant armed violence in 
Nigeria is to be exerted. This particularly needs to target the increasingly 
sophisticated weapons being acquired in Nigeria. SALW controls on Nigeria’s 
long borders are porous or are non-existent or open to abuse. Internally, gun 
possession or ownership laws exist but are not widely enforced. More robust 
instruments and measures are required in all these areas, but are unlikely to be 
initiated any time soon. 
 Measures need to be taken to address security sector dissemination of weaponry 
to armed gangs and other actors. This should include prosecution of individuals 
involved. However, action in this area will be difficult given current networks of 
corruption within the system. Further, issues such as poor pay need to be 
addressed in the security sector to decrease motives to increase income through 
illicit activities. 
 The security sector needs to respond in a more proportionate way to challenges to 
state authority and outbreaks of armed violence. 
 SSR is required. Limited SSR measures took place in 1999 when the government 
retired large numbers of senior and middle-ranking officers and there has been 
minor follow up. However, SSR that addresses some of the deep-rooted problems 
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in the security sector is required, including measures to deal with retired 
personnel who are, it appears, diffusing SALW and technical knowledge. 
 Programming addressing SALW possession needs urgently to be set in train. 
Existing programming does not seem in the main to be directly addressing this 
issue. This programming might include Arms for Development (AfD) type 
programming that actually offers incentives for communities to give in arms, as 
well as programming that addresses the fractures between communities. 
Establishing weapons-free-zones could be a priority in consultation with local 
communities. However, this will not be straightforward given the rampant 
insecurity that exists in many conflict zones in Nigeria and the lack of faith in the 
security services. This implies that extensive confidence-building measures will 
be required, quite possibly involving regional and international support, in co-
operation with the Nigerian government, as well as civil society. 
 Reversing the gun culture and militarization of society is an urgent, but an 
extremely problematic, priority in Nigeria. The rapid pace of the militarization of 
society since 1999 is startling and shows signs of deepening. Sensitisation 
measures would be a good starting point, but gun culture seem so embedded in 
many youths for example, including students, that this will be extremely difficult 
to reverse. Elements of civil society are attempting to change perceptions 
regarding gun possession and usage but appear to be overwhelmed in the 
prevailing culture of violence and bitterness in many states. Unless security 
services can provide security across community divides the demand and 
willingness to use SALW is likely to increase. 
 Conflict resolution initiatives to address differences along ethno-religious lines 
can make a contribution to defusing violence but face an uphill battle in the face 
of widespread deprivation and ready access to SALW. 
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